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Abstract
Although based on theoretical foundations, the pollution haven hypothesis has never been clearly proven
empirically. In this study, we reexamine this hypothesis by a fresh take on both its theoretical and empirical
aspects. While applying a geographic economy model on French rm-level data, we conrm the hypothesis for
the global sample. Through sensitivity analysis, we validate it for Central and Eastern European countries,
emerging and high-income OECD countries, but not for the major part of the Commonwealth of Independent
States countries. Finally, we show that the pollution haven hypothesis is conrmed in the strongest manner
for emerging economies.
Keywords: FDI; Environmental regulation; Economic geography; Pollution haven hypothesis.
JEL classication: F12; F18; Q28
1 Introduction
There is, by now, quite an extensive literature on the factors that inuence rmslocation decisions abroad.
Among these factors, the most studied are the cost of production factors such as labor and capital, and the mar-
ket access. Additional factors such as taxation or agglomeration e¤ects have also been studied. More recently, a
new factor appeared as a potential determinant of rmslocation abroad: environmental regulation. This factor
was notably put in evidence by Copeland and Taylor (2004) through a simple model of specialization and trade
according to which the rich countries, that protect their environment, should abandon their polluting activities
to developing countries, whose environmental legislation and enforcement are not severe. This statement illus-
trates the commonly studied "pollution haven hypothesis" (PHH). Nevertheless, empirical research often fails
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to prove this hypothesis. Furthermore, an approach based on the classic theory of endowments would yield an
opposite conclusion: polluting activities are generally capital-intensive and should thus locate in rich countries
where capital is abundant.
The debate on the pollution haven hypothesis produced a political challenge by trying to nd clear empirical
evidence in order to prove or refute what is really a complex and dynamic issue: how does environmental
regulation interact with more and more mobile production?
Generally, statistical studies prove that the pollution haven hypothesis cannot be clearly identied. Four
potential problems in this literature require more empirical tests. First of all, most studies lack theoretical
foundations for the construction of the equations to be tested, which often entails specication errors. Secondly,
the studies of Zhang and Markusen (1999) and Cheng and Kwan (2000) demonstrate the importance of relative
endowments of production factors in the explanation of the foreign direct investment (FDI). The absence of
this determinant can lead to omitted variable bias. Next, Levinson and Taylor (2008) and Keller and Levinson
(2002) emphasize the empirical importance of controlling for the unobservable characteristics of industries and
locations. Finally, as noted by Smarzynska and Wei (2004), several studies use very aggregated data on FDI,
and proxies of the severity of the environmental policy that are far o¤ the real variable to be taken into account,
which generally results in bias induced from measurement-error.
In this study we considered these various limits and tried to remedy them by di¤erent means. Consequently,
we present a classic theoretical model of geographic economy (open economy model with increasing returns
to scale, monopolistic competition and trade costs), which supplies us a testable equation for determinants of
the rmslocation choice, among which we distinguish the impact of the environmental regulation. According
to our knowledge, at the moment, there is no empirical study on the link between FDI and environment, in
particular on the pollution haven hypothesis, based on a theoretical model of geographic economy. Such models
are used in some purely theoretical studies, without empirical estimation of the forces at work (e.g., Rauscher,
2005; Conrad, 2005; Van Marrewijk, 2005). The geographic economy model presents the advantage to take
into account the complexity of FDI determinants, such as: production factor endowments (labor, capital, etc.);
distance between trade partners, local market size and access to other important markets (market potential
of the host country); cultural, historic, linguistic connections. While representing the demand, the market
potential derived from theory has the advantage, in comparison to other often used variables (GDP, population,
etc.), to take into account the accessibility to the host countrys market and that of its neighbors, the trade
barriers and competition. Besides, the additional interest of this model is that it enables us to introduce the
environmental regulation as a determinant of the location decision. Thus, for the specication of the location
choice, we are inspired by the study of Head and Mayer (2004), to which we introduce environmental regulation.
Besides labor and capital, we consider pollution as a production factor, the cost of which is the pollution tax
established exogenously by the government. Furthermore, in our empirical model, the xed costs corresponding
to the launch of an activity / creation of a rm di¤er across countries and thus have an impact on the rms
location choice. These costs are proxied in our study by the institutional quality of the potential locations.
For the empirical test we use rm-level data, in particular, data on French rms. Our focus is on transition
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countries, while also considering other groups of countries. In fact, if in 1992 the transition and developing
countries counted 30 % of the French multinationalssubsidiaries, in 2002 these countries were the destination
of 45% of the French rms abroad. Concerning the specic case of the Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs) and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), between 1992 and 2002 the
French multinationals multiplied by six the number of their subsidiaries in this region in order to represent 11%
of the total of the French rms abroad (3 % in 1992)1 . Regarding emerging countries, while they counted about
25% of the French establishments in 1992, in 2002 they counted about 35%. This important reorientation of
the French FDI towards countries with an environmental regulation less severe than that of industrial nations
represents an interesting case study for the research on the pollution haven hypothesis.
Furthermore, to represent the environmental regulations stringency in a more complete way, we create a
complex and dynamic index which estimates the relative severity of the environmental policy between countries,
based on a diverse set of variables.
Finally, in order to take into account the specic characteristics of industries and countries, the empirical
estimations are performed by controlling for di¤erent types of industrial sectors (according to their pollution
intensity) and groups of countries (transition CEECs, transition countries of CIS, emerging countries2 , and
high-income OECD countries3).
The contribution of this article lies in the empirical estimation and test of the pollution haven hypothesis,
using rm level data on worldwide location of French manufacturing subsidiaries. Our empirical results show
that looking at diverse countries (pooled sample), the French rms of the manufacturing sector, and in particular
the ones belonging to more polluting sectors, prefer to settle in countries where the environmental regulation is
the most lenient, thereby conrming the pollution haven hypothesis. Sensitivity analysis including interaction
terms between the environmental regulation and the di¤erent country groups generate three major conclusions.
First of all, we validate this hypothesis for all the CEECs, emerging and high-income OECD countries in our
sample. Concerning the CIS transition countries, we discover a prevailing opposite relationship: it is rather the
lenient environmental regulation that deters the foreign investments. Finally, we show that emerging economies
constitute the group of countries for which this hypothesis is most clearly conrmed.
This study is structured as follows: in section 2 we present the relevant literature analyzing the relation
between FDI and environmental regulation. In the third section, we describe briey the theoretical model of
the new geographic economy giving the econometric specication for the analysis of the determinants of rms
location decision. The fourth section describes the empirical model and data used. In the fth section we
analyze the empirical results and provide some extended analyses. The last section concludes.
1Source : Survey on French subsidiaries implanted abroad, managed by the Directorate of Treasury and Economic Policy on
2003.
2An emerging country is a country, up to there under developed, which undertaken measures and accumulated means, in
particular legal and cultural, in order to begin a phase of fast growth of the production and social welfare. According to Morgan
Stanley Emerging Markets Index, in July 2006, the status of emerging country was awarded to the following countries: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Iran, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the
Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela.
3High-income OECD members except Czech Republic and Republic of Korea, considered here as transition and emerging
countries, respectively (see Appendix C for the list of countries included in our sample).
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2 Review of the literature
The increasing relocation of industries towards developing countries raises some questions, mainly in the
eld of employment, and more recently concerning the environment. The relatively less severe environmental
regulation in developing countries can create a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive production, and
trade openness and FDI could then damage the environment of the host country. From a theoretical point
of view, researchers proposed two main hypotheses to explain the direct impact of international trade and
FDI on the environment: the "pollution haven hypothesis" and the "factor endowment hypothesis". The rst
hypothesis assumes that countries are identical except for exogenous di¤erences in their environmental policies.
Thus it is cheaper to produce pollution-intensive goods in countries with a weaker environmental regulation,
usually poorer countries. Trade, inferred by di¤erences in environmental policy, thus creates pollution havens
in the poorer countries. The "factor endowment hypothesis" is the main alternative to the pollution haven
hypothesis. It suggests that trade is determined by the relative abundance of production factors (labor and
capital in most models) in each country. Thus, if pollution-intensive goods are generally more capital intensive,
they should be produced in the developed countries, instead of the developing countries. At the same time, the
developed countries are supposed to be abundant in capital and have a stricter environmental policy, unlike
poor countries. This illustrates the narrow connection between both hypotheses, which should be taken into
account while testing anyone of them.
Unfortunately, the empirical validation of the pollution haven hypothesis is always rather delicate. One of the
founder-articles is Grossman and Krueger (1993), which however shows that the trade liberalization between the
United States and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s did not come along with a relocation of polluting industries,
which could be explained by the very weak weight of environmental costs imposed on American rms during
this period. Since then, articles on this subject followed without a consensus being established, while concerns
abound about the e¤ects of environmental standards on trade ows and FDI. However, the scientic research
did not manage to prove that environmental regulation a¤ects trade or rmsinvestment decisions (e.g., Ja¤e
et al., 1995; Wheeler, 2001).
Ederington et al. (2005) explain partially why previous studies did not conrm the pollution haven hypoth-
esis. They recall that international trade is essentially made between developed countries, whose regulation is
quite similar. However, if one examines only the ows between industrial nations and developing countries, the
environmental standards have more pronounced e¤ects on the trade structure: with the strengthening of the
environmental regulation of the United States, imports from developing countries decrease. In fact, Ederington
et al. (2005) notice that polluting industries are generally the least mobile geographically and thus, it becomes
more expensive to establish production in countries that apply a less rigorous regulation.
Most studies in this eld use data on trade ows while analyzing the pollution haven hypothesis. Some more
recent papers examine this hypothesis by using data on FDI. Eskeland and Harrison (2003) study the e¤ect of
the abatement cost and pollution intensity on FDI in Morocco, Cote dIvoire, Venezuela and Mexico, and nd
essentially no empirical support for the pollution haven hypothesis. Besides, they nd that the United States
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factories are appreciably more e¢ cient in terms of energy use and employ more "clean" types of energy than
the host countrys plants. In a group of 24 transition countries, Smarzynska and Wei (2004) nd some, however
relatively weak, proof for the pollution haven hypothesis.
Dean et al. (2004), in a study on China, discover a relationship between FDI and environmental regulation
completely di¤erent from that evoked by the pollution haven hypothesis. In fact, the authors nd that a
less stringent regulation is a signicant determinant for Chinese villagesattractiveness for joint ventures with
partners from Hong-Kong, Macao, Taiwan and other countries of South Asia. On the contrary, industrial
nations (United States, Japan, United Kingdom etc.) are attracted by higher standards, regardless of industry
pollution intensity. The authors suggest that this result could be explained by technological di¤erences.
Other studies, however, assert that environmental regulation inuences the spatial allocation of capital. A
seminal paper in this literature is that of Keller and Levinson (2002). What distinguished this work was its
using of, on the one hand, panel data on inward FDI ows in the United States over a long period of time
and, on the other hand, an innovative measure of the relative abatement costs across the States. By applying
standard parametric models on panel data, the authors nd a robust result showing that abatement costs had
moderate dissuasive e¤ects on foreign investments. Given the implications of such a conclusion for trade and
environmental policies, any evaluation of the sensibility of these results to changes in the parametric hypotheses
is well justied. The application to Kellers and Levinson (2002) data of the recently developed non parametric
techniques (Henderson and Millimet, 2007) reveals two results: rst, some of the parametric results are not
robust, and second, the impact of relative abatement costs is not uniform across the States, and is generally of
a smaller magnitude than previously suggested.
Finally, a recent study (Cole et al., 2006) shows the existence of an inverse relationship between FDI and
environmental regulation: it is FDI that inuences the environmental policy, but this e¤ect is a function of the
degree of corruption in the host country. The authors show that at high (low) corruption levels, FDI leads to
less (more) stringent environmental policy.
Di¤erent theoretical and empirical factors can explain the lack of robust empirical proof for the pollution
haven hypothesis. One reason for which developing countries do not tend to become pollution havens can be
the fact that the stringency of the environmental standards is only one, and maybe not the most important,
factor determining the comparative advantages between countries. In particular, the endowments of factors
such as qualied human capital and physical capital determine largely industrial location and the products that
a country will export. As far as the strongly polluting industries tend also to be intensive in capital, the relative
lack of capital in the developing countries can prevail over the advantage of low abatement costs (e.g., Antweiler
et al., 2001; Cole and Elliott, 2002).
It is thus di¢ cult to conclude on this point, in so far as the laxness of the environmental policy, supposed
to attract polluting rms, may be associated with other characteristics that, in their turn, generally discourage
the establishment of foreign rms. It is notably the case of weak institutions, expressed through high corruption
level, lack of civil freedomsand property rightsprotection, etc. That is why, as Smarzynska and Wei (2004)
underline, it is necessary to take into account the e¤ect of institutions on FDI, while trying to test the pollution
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haven hypothesis.
3 Theoretical background
The theoretical frame of our model is based on the classic hypotheses of the new geographic economy,
open economy model with increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition and trade costs. Monopolistic
competition is a common market form, characterized by the following: there are many producers and many
consumers in a given market; consumers have clearly dened preferences and sellers attempt to di¤erentiate their
products from those of their competitors; goods and services are heterogeneous, usually (though not always)
intrinsically so; there are few barriers to entry and exit; producers have a degree of control over price. This
frame seems relevant to our study since these criteria characterize well the French market.
Moreover, the existence of intra-industry trade is typically associated with increasing returns to scale, product
di¤erentiation and monopolistic competition (Helpman and Krugman, 1985), and the volume of such trade is
expected to be higher the greater the equality of trading partnersGDP per capita (Helpman, 1987). Hummels
and Levinsohn (1995), however, in repeating Helpmans (1987) analysis for a sample of non-OECD countries,
found that gravity models still worked well for a group of countries whose bilateral trade was more likely
characterized by homogeneous goods. Evenett and Keller (2002) have argued that the gravity model can
nest both the increasing returns/product di¤erentiation story as well as a more conventional homogeneous
goods/relative factor abundance story. Thus, we can use the monopolistic competition model in order to
explain French multinationalsbehavior concerning location in both the developed and developing countries.
In our model, the world consists of i = 1; :::N open economies. In every country there are two sectors
- industry and agriculture. Given the interest of this paper in the industrys location, we model the second
sector as simply as possible. Namely, the traditional sector A is supposed to produce a homogeneous good
under Walrasian conditions (constant returns to scale and perfect competition), which is traded costlessly.
The manufacturing sector M produces a continuum of di¤erentiated goods, called varieties v, under increasing
returns to scale in an environment of monopolistic competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Each rm produces
a distinct variety. Let us denote the elasticity of substitution between two varieties  > 1. The shipping of
these varieties towards another country implies "iceberg" transport costs:  > 1 units must be sent so that a
unity arrives at the destination; the rest,    1, is melt in transit. The consumers spend a part 0 <  < 1
of their income E on the purchase of the composite good M , the rest is spent on the good A, and they have
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) sub-utility functions for the composite good. Under constraints of
income and each varietys price, the maximization of this sub-utility results in the following demand function
of the countrys j consumers for a specic variety h produced in a country i (see details in Appendix A):
qij (h) =
[pi (h)  ij ]
 P
i
R
ni
[pi (v)  ij ]
1 
dv
Ej (1)
where pi is the price of the variety h, h 2 [1:::ni], in the exporting country i; ni is the mass of varieties in any
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country i, i 2 N ; and  ij is the trade cost supported by the consumer in the importing country j. The trade
cost includes all transaction costs connected to the shipment of goods in space and across borders.
One of the most important factors for the rms location decision is the production cost. The total production
cost in every potential location is supposed to take the following form: ciqi + Fi. The increasing returns result
from xed costs Fi(h) specic to the rm producing a variety h (further named rm h) and related to launching
activity in the country i, qi(h) is the total production of the rm h in the country i and ci(h) is its constant
production marginal cost. A rm tries to maximize its gross prot on every market. We can write the gross
prot realized in any country j by a rm h implanted in a country i:
ij (h) = [pi(h)  ci(h)]  ijqij(h) (2)
In this model à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980), the production price is a simple mark-up
on the marginal cost: p = c ( 1) . By substituting it in the equation (1), we obtain the following expression for
the quantity that a rm h produces in country i and would ship to any destination j:
qij (h) =
   1

[ci (h)  ij ]
 P
i
R
ni
[ci (v)  ij ]
1 
dv
Ej (3)
By replacing the expression (3) and the price expression in the equation (2), by summarizing the gross prots
realized by a rm h located in country i while shipping its goods to any market j (equation 2) and by deducting
the rms xed cost Fi (h), we obtain the total net prot that a rm h could earn in any potential location i:
i (h) =
ci (h)
1 

X
j
ij
Ej
Gj
  Fi (h) = ci (h)
1 

MPi   Fi (h) (4)
with ij = 
1 
ij , Gj =
P
i
R
ni
[ci (v)  ij ]
1 
dv and MPi =
P
j ij
Ej
Gj
. The location choice is thus deter-
mined by the comparison of the characteristics of every potential location: demand (represented by MPi, an
abbreviation of the Market Potential concept developed in section 4), cost of launching an activity/ creating an
enterprise, and production cost.
Taking logarithms and denoting i =
ci(h)
1 
 MPi, we write the protability U of a rm h located in country
i:
Ui (h)  lni (h) = ln (i   Fi (h)) = lni + ln

1  e(lnFi(h) ln i)

(5)
We have thus:
Ui (h)  lnMPi   (   1) ln ci (h)  ln + ln

1  e(lnFi(h) ln i)

(6)
In our model, there are three production factors: K - capital, L - labor and Poll - pollution (the last
factor is used only in industry). One of the most common forms used to represent the cost function is that of
Cobb-Douglas with constant returns: c = 1Aw
rt, where  = 1   (+ ) and w, r and t are costs of labor,
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capital and pollution, respectively. The share of labor in the rms production process is noted by , of the
capital is  and nally that of the pollution is , whereas A represents the total factor productivity. With this
last specication we can rewrite equation (6) in the following way:
Ui (h)  lnMPi + (   1) lnAi    (h) (   1) lnwi    (h) (   1) ln ri 
   (h) (   1) ln ti   ln + ln

1  e(lnFi(h) ln i)

(7)
The equation (7) predicts that the protability of a rm settled in a country is an increasing function with
regard to the market potential and the global factor productivity in this country, and decreasing with regard to
xed and production costs. For more simplicity, we present this relation as follows:
Ui (h)  f

lnMP
+
; lnAi
+
; lnwi 
; ln ri 
; ln ti 
; lnFi 

(8)
This specication represents the theoretical background for the empirical work that now follows.
4 Empirical work
4.1 A location choice model: the conditional logit
In this paper, we seek to study the factors determining a specic rm single choice between some unordered
alternatives. Each subsidiary h chooses country i where it will locate. An unordered choice model particularly
well adapted to our question is the model developed by McFadden in 1974, i.e., the conditional logit (rm
xed-e¤ects logit model).
The conditional logit is a discrete choice model based on prot maximization. In such a model, each rm
compares the prots related to the di¤erent location alternatives, and selects, among the N alternatives, the
location that will maximize its prot i(h):
In our example, for a French rm h facing N alternatives, the protability of choosing i can be written
i(h) = 
0Zi + "hi (9)
with Zi a vector of independent variables that vary between location alternatives,  the vector of estimated
parameters and "hi a random error term, which corresponds to unobserved variables related to location i and
a¤ecting the choice of rm h.
Each French subsidiary h, faced with N choices, will select a location i if the expected prot i(h) exceeds
the expected prots j(h), for all j 2 N alternative locations.
The model is made operational by a particular choice of distribution for the disturbances. Let Yh be a
random variable that indicates the choice made. Following McFadden, if and only if the N disturbances are
independent and identically distributed with Weibull distribution, the probability that rm h chooses location
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i is given by:
Pr(Yh = i) = exp(
0Zi)=
NP
j=1
exp(0Zj) (10)
This intuitive formulation of the conditional logit model presents nevertheless some limits due to the as-
sumption concerning the disturbances, which implies the property of Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA). According to the IIA property, the likelihood of making a choice is independent of the other alternatives.
In practice, this assumption could be problematic. In order to mitigate this problem, in our econometric speci-
cation we introduce in addition to the explanatory variables, dummy variables representing the four di¤erent
country groups forming our sample. With the assumption that the error terms are correlated only within coun-
try groups and not across groups, the dummy variables (dened in section 5) should capture this correlation
and reduce the IIA problem.
4.2 Data description
Dependent variable
The location choice
Data concerning French rms location choice have been gathered from the Survey about French rms located
abroad, conducted by the Directorate of Treasury and Economic Policy (DGTPE in French) in 2002. This
Department collects from French Economic Missions abroad the census of units whose capital is owned by
a French parent company by at least 10%. The survey includes among other information, the units date of
creation and their French classication NAF93 code, data which is crucial for this analysis. The global database
covers 21379 investment decisions realized in all economic sectors in 128 countries during the past century.
In our study, we concentrate on the manufacturing industry, excluding the two-level NAF93 code DF "Coke,
Petroleum Rening and Nuclear Industry" which corresponds to specic sectors whose location determinants
are beyond the scope of this study. In the end, reduced to manufacturing sectors and limited to data availability
for the explanatory variables, our empirical sample covers 1332 French investments in 55 countries from 1996
to 20024 .
Explanatory variables
As we have seen in our theoretical model, the protability of a location for a rm depends on the market
potential of the location and its total factor productivity, the rms production costs, and the xed costs that
correspond to launching an activity. We have calculated market potential and total factor productivity growth,
following commonly used methods described hereafter. Production and xed costs are represented using several
proxies that we present below.
The market potential
The market potential is a general concept regarding the impact of demand on rms location. Gross domestic
product of the host country or its population are the most commonly used proxies for demand variables, but they
4List of countries in Appendix C.
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are very partial. Indeed, measuring the local demand through these variables present the major inconvenience
to not take into account the demands emanating from nearby countries and the facility or di¢ culty to reach
them. In this study we exceed these limits by using the concept of market potential of a location. Here, market
potential (MP ) means "demand accessibility". This concept was introduced by Harris (1954) who proposed, as
measure of the potential demand that a rm faces, the sum of economic sizes of surrounding markets weighted
over distances: MPi =
PN
j=1
GDPj
distij
: The concept was then validated by its deduction from the standard model
of the new trade theory, such as presented in the equation (4) (Krugman, 1992; Head and Mayer, 2004). The
presentation of the market potential à la Harris is very insu¢ cient because of omission of the price index,
Gj , which allows taking into account the e¤ect of the competition. Besides, this simplication supposes that
the simple distance includes all costs, while the literature on the border e¤ects on trade between countries
refutes this hypothesis by underlining the importance of obstacles bound to borders (McCallum, 1995; Head
and Mayer, 2000). In this study analyzing the determinants of French rms location choice, it seems then
essential to consider, besides the distance, additional trade costs induced by crossing borders and sharing or not
a common language, while estimating the market potential of all possible destinations. Following Redding and
Venables (2004) and Head and Mayer (2004), we build a measure of market potential that aggregates the local
demand and the demands emanating from nearby markets, while taking into account the e¤ect of demands
depreciation due to obstacles related to shipping goods in space and across borders. The estimation technique
is presented in Appendix B.
Moreover, given that market potential values have been calculated using estimators of trade regression5 , the
standard-errors of equation (10) are biased as they include also trade equations errors. We use the bootstrap
technique in order to obtain correct standard-errors (limiting also measurement-error-induced bias resulting
from using a calculation technique for total factor productivity variable). Standard-errors reported in clogit
regressions table are thus based on 100 bootstrap replications (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993, for more details).
Total factor productivity
While there is no available data on total factor productivity , we apply here a "Growth Accounting" calcu-
lation method, following the technique developed by Robert Solow (1956) to calculate the rate of technological
progress (TFP_growth). According to this technique, the sources of output growth are: contribution of capital
growth = KK ; contribution of labor growth = 
L
L ; and contribution of total factor productivity growth =
TFP
TFP . To resume, the technological progress in our study equals output growth which is not explained by
factors growth (TFP_growth = PIBPIB   KK   LL )6 .
Factor costs
Following our theoretical model, the total production cost faced by a rm is composed by labor, capital and
environmental costs.
Suitable variables to reect the capital and the labor costs would have been respectively the capital interest
rate and the wages in manufacturing sectors. On account of many missing values in the International Labor
5Cf Appendix B.
6The coe¢ cients  and  are obtained by running regression: lnPIB =  lnK +  lnL + ", for each of our country-groups,
separately.
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O¢ ce Laborsta database, related to international labor costs, and because of an expected high correlation
between these costs and governance factors, we have nally decided to capture capital and labor costs through
the countriesrelative endowments in production factors. This is represented by the variable KL, which is the
ratio K/L, with K the capital stock7 and L the total labor force.
The most complex cost to be represented is the environmental regulation (ER). Since a direct measure does
not exist for this cost, we had recourse to di¤erent proxies that allowed us to compute, through the Z-score
method8 , a global and quite exhaustive Environmental Regulation index (ER index) for each country in our
sample. This index integrates the following variables:
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA ratied): this variable distinguishes countries having ratied
several international environmental agreements. Thus, countries ratifying more MEAs prove their governments
concern about environmental protection. We retained the MEAs ratication year (and not the year of signature)
since it is the ratication that imposes compliance to international environmental treaties.
ISO 14001 (ISO 14001 certications/billion US$ GDP): we have integrated for each country the number of
ISO 14001 certications normalized by the countrys GDP. Even if ISO certication is a private and voluntary
initiative, this variable manages to express a global state of mind prevailing in a country. For illustration,
this variable is also used in the construction of the Environment Sustainability Index jointly initiated by the
Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy and Columbia University. On one hand, one can suppose that
a higher number of 14001 ISO certied rms is the consequence of strict standards and controls imposed by
the government. On the other hand, countries where this variable is the most important should be considered
as countries where population is the most sensitive to environmental issues and thus the most exacting to
environmental policys severity.
International NGOs (INGOsmembers/million of population): this variable represents the density of in-
ternational non-governmental organizations with membership. As mentioned by Dasgupta et al. (1995) and
Smarzynska and Wei (2004), international NGOs make local population sensitive to environmental problems,
and also put pressure on governments to respect laws. Thus, a more important presence of international NGOs
in a country would imply a more stringent environmental regulation.
Energy e¢ ciency (GDP/unit of energy used): the interest of using such a quantitative variable is that it
gives a real measure of the impact of the preceding variables9 . This allows distinguishing countries that apply
concrete environmental measures from the ones that adopt a "theoretical" environmental policy not really
restrictive to rms.
Thus, grouping these variables in a single index allows us to encompass the general environmental regulation
7The capital stock is calculated by using the following formula: Kt= gross xed capital formationt + 0.95 capital stockt 1.
Due to data availability (particularly concerning transition countries), the initial stock is represented by the gross xed capital
formation in 1990.
8We rst calculate for each variable and year, the distance between each countrys value and the mean of the group expressed
in standard-errors, following the formula: z =
 
Xjt  Xt

=t. We obtain thus values allowing to classify the countries below
or above the mean. Then, we calculate the unweighted average of all variablesz-scores. Finally, we apply the standard normal
percentile technique which gives the value 0 to the least average Z-score and 100 to the highest. Thus, the value 50 corresponds to
the mean of the sample.
9A more appropriate quantitative measure would have been the manufacturing sectorsCO2 emissions normalized by the value
added in the respective sectors. Due to a lack of consistent data that would have prevented us from including several countries, we
have preferred to consider energy e¢ ciency, which generates similar results (available upon request).
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of countries according to di¤erent more precise environmental aspects. For instance, some countries can have a
small number of ISO 14001 certied rms, but high energy e¢ ciency. The use of one variable rather than the
other in the regression would then give an incomplete vision of the local environmental regulation and result in
wrong ER coe¢ cients. As illustration, we can cite the work of Smarzynska and Wei (2004) who, by using several
too precise environmental variables, taken separately in the estimations, did not manage to capture the general
aspect of the environmental regulation, which may have prevented them from proving explicitly the pollution
haven hypothesis. Moreover, introducing a unique proxy for environmental regulation stringency can lead to
biased results. For example, if we only use the MEA variable as the environmental proxy without controlling
for other aspects of the environmental policy climate, it could capture in this case the states willingness to keep
reliable relationships on international arena, which is usually favorable for FDI, rather than its direct concern
to international, and much less domestic environmental compliance.
Table 1 presents correlations among the four variables and the ER index. On the one hand, some variables
are well correlated, e.g., ISO 14001 and NGO variables (0.46), or MEA and Energy e¢ ciency variables (0.39),
while others, e.g. ISO 14001 and Energy e¢ ciency, have a correlation coe¢ cient close to zero (0.092). On
the other hand, we can see in the rst column that all variables are strongly enough positively correlated with
the ER index. This lends support to our argument that these variables measure each one a di¤erent aspect of
environmental stringency, and that taken together they represent environmental stringency in general.
- Table 1 here -
Governance factors
Since there is no variable representing precisely a rms xed costs to establish itself in a location, we
have used proxies of institutional quality in a location in order to capture these costs. Indeed, bad governance
generates additional costs while launching an activity and creates a feeling of insecurity among investors. Factors
related to country governance constitute then determining factors to rmslocation abroad, especially when we
consider developing countries or transition economies, where governance problems are rather frequent. In our
paper, we use as proxies three governance indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2005): the corruption level
(CORRUP ), the political stability (POLSTAB) and the government regulatory quality (REGULQUAL).
CORRUP is the inverse of the original Kaufmann index which reects the control of corruption in states (
a higher value meaning a better governance outcome). Our corruption variable should then have a negative
e¤ect on location decisions as a result of greater corruption. At the opposite, we expect the attractiveness of a
location to increase with political stability and absence of violence (POLSTAB), and the government ability to
implement promoting regulations (REGULQUAL). Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix present descriptive statistics
for the independent variables and information about the data.
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5 Empirical results
Table 2 shows estimation coe¢ cients concerning the impact of di¤erent factors on the location of French
rms. Besides variables presented in the preceding section, our estimations include also dummy variables that
we have created by grouping countries in four homogenous clusters: TrCEEC for transition CEECs, TrCIS
for transition countries of CIS, EMERG for emerging countries, and OECD for high-income OECD members.
Variables are log-linearized, and KL and ER have been lagged one-year to avoid any possible endogeneity with
the dependent variable.
Our base model, estimation (1), shows results consistent with theory and our predictions for all the explana-
tory variables. First, concerning our core variable in this study, environmental regulation, it seems to be an
important factor for French manufacturing rmslocation decisions. The estimated coe¢ cient of the environ-
mental regulation index is negative and consistently signicant at the 1% level, indicating that a more stringent
environmental regulation deters French manufacturing investments. Everything else equal, all industries have
interest to avoid additional costs induced by stricter environmental regulation, since there is generally no to-
tally "clean" manufacturing industry. Second, market potential and total factor productivity growth appear
to be important attractive factors for French direct investments abroad. Moreover, French rms are attracted
by relatively labor-abundant countries, an increase in the ratio K/L having a negative and strongly signicant
e¤ect on the location decision. Finally, host countriesgovernance also inuences French rmsdecision to settle
or not in a country, since our three governance variables are signicant and show the expected signs. Thus,
politically stable countries attract French FDI, as well as a satisfactory regulatory quality, while a high level
of corruption discourages it. All our dummy variables representing country groups are signicant, and indicate
that between 1996 and 2002, French rms preferred to establish predominantly in emerging countries compared
to OECD countries, but much less in transition economies.
- Table 2 here -
In order to assert these main results and control for any potential e¤ect on location of trade openness
between host countries and France, we have incorporated to the base model the variable PTA (columns (2) to
(5)). Variable PTA takes value 1 if a country is a EU-member or has contracted a preferential trade agreement
with the European Union, and 0 otherwise. We observe in column (2) that PTA has the expected sign for the
pollution haven hypothesis to work (under free trade, relocation of pollution-intensive production takes place
from countries with stringent pollution regulation to countries with lax regulation countries) and it is signicant
at the 1% level, while other variables and especially the ER index maintain their sign and signicance. Dummy
variables TrCEEC and TrCIS are no more signicant, perhaps because in this case French rms choose countries
depending on the existence of a trade agreement rather than their belonging to a specic country group.
To highlight PHH reality, we focus in model (3) on the particular case of rms belonging to the most polluting
manufacturing sectors, dened here as sectors the abatement costs of which exceed 0.5% of value added in the
classication provided by Raspiller and Riedinger (2004). These rms should be more a¤ected by a stricter
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environmental regulation. We rst notice that nearly all the coe¢ cients keep high signicance, which attests to
the robustness of our results. Nevertheless, parameters estimates reveal some particular characteristics specic
to polluting rms. Regarding the environmental regulation index, the coe¢ cient remains very signicant at the
1% level, with a higher magnitude, indicating the higher sensitivity of most polluting rms to environmental
regulation. This result emphasizes the pollution haven hypothesis previously proven in models (1) and (2).
Market potential and the K/L ratio coe¢ cients have lower magnitudes, while the variables for political stability
and corruption remain signicant at the 10% level only. At the opposite, total factor productivity and regulatory
quality show a higher impact on FDI location compared to the model including all industries. We can deduce
from these ndings that rms in the most polluting sectors, that often are more capital intensive and require
heavier investments, may be relatively more attracted by capital endowments, total factor productivity and
regulatory quality than the less polluting ones. For the same reasons, these rms are also geographically less
mobile, and thus may be slightly less sensitive to market potential. All dummies remain quite robust.
In order to verify the robustness of these rst empirical results, we run two additional regressions. Firstly,
we introduce in model (4) the share of research and development expenditure in GDP (R&D) as a proxy for
the total factor productivity, instead of TFP_growth. Secondly, we include the two variables simultaneously
in model (5), considering that TFP_growth represents the e¤ect of technological progress while R&D captures
the impact of a given level of total factor productivity. Moreover, since rich countries have usually the largest
share of R&D expenditure in GDP, the use of R&D as a proxy for the level of total factor productivity allows us
to control for some e¤ects of the countrys economic development that could be correlated with the stringency of
its environmental regulation. The regression results conrm the robustness of model (3), except for CORRUP
and REGULQUAL which are no more statistically signicant in both models. The variables TFP_growth and
R&D are statistically signicant at the 5% level and have the expected positive signs. As for the environmental
regulation, even after an additional control for the countrys development level, it maintains a negative e¤ect on
FDI location, signicant at the 1% level. Considering the high number of missing data on R&D, we concentrate
further sensitivity analysis on model (3).
Country-group analysis
Based on the previous results, which provide evidence in favour of the pollution haven hypothesis, we extend
our analysis in order to distinguish which countries are the most likely to constitute pollution havens. To this
goal, we need to introduce interaction terms between the index of environmental regulation and the country-
group dummies. However, as noted by Ai and Norton (2003), the interaction e¤ects magnitude and signicance
should not be based on the interaction coe¢ cient in non-linear models, e.g. the conditional logit, because its
magnitude and signicance may vary across the range of predicted values. Consequently, given that interaction
terms cannot be correctly interpreted from our conditional logit model results, we rst run estimation of model
(3) through a logit model with adjusted standard-errors for intragroup correlation10 . Since the results are
consistent with those found with the conditional logit, we can then use the Nortons et al. (2004) methodology
10Estimation results available from the authors upon request.
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recommended for computing the marginal e¤ects of the interaction terms in logit models. Below, we present
rst the marginal e¤ects of model (3) logit estimations, with ER impact by country-group.
- Table 3 here -
Apart from the ER index, and except the corruption variable, which is not signicant in models (7) and
(9), our explanatory variables maintain their sign and signicance across all models (6) to (9), as compared
to model (3)11 . Concerning the environmental regulation, in models (6) to (9), where the country group in
the interaction term varies, the sign of the coe¢ cient of the ER variable indicates once again that a stricter
environmental regulation deters foreign investments. Concerning the e¤ect for di¤erent country groups, we
observe that the interaction term is not signicant for CEECs, emerging and OECD countries (models (6), (8)
and (9) respectively), suggesting that the e¤ect of environmental regulation for these countries is identical to
the ER variables marginal e¤ect, i.e., a negative and signicant e¤ect, and does not di¤er across these country
groups. By comparison, model (7) for CIS countries, yields a signicant interaction term, and results in a
positive marginal e¤ect of about 0.157, which indicates that a strengthened environmental regulation in this
country group attracts French rms. These results suggest that the pollution haven hypothesis does not hold for
CIS countries, while it is uniformly conrmed for the other country groups. However, as previously mentioned,
the interaction e¤ects magnitude and signicance may vary across the range of predicted values, and this early
conclusion can be misleading. The methodology recommended by Norton et al. (2004) allows us to visualize
the correct interaction e¤ect through two gures.
We present below the interaction e¤ect for CIS countries.
- Figure 1 here -
We observe that the interaction e¤ect is positive across all observations, and that it o¤sets the negative ER
marginal e¤ect of -0.031 in model (7) since it takes values superior to 0.031 in most cases. In addition, Figure
2 shows that it is signicant across almost the entire range of predicted probabilities of choosing a country
(X-axis), since most of observations have a z-statistic superior to the 1.96 value (represented by the upper
horizontal line on the Y-axis) corresponding to the 5% level of signicance.
- Figure 2 here -
Thus, the interpretation of the interaction e¤ect compared to the ER marginal e¤ect of -0.031 mentions that
a stricter regulation in CIS countries generally attracts foreign investments, with the pollution haven hypothesis
nevertheless validated for a minor part of CIS observations. This predominant opposite e¤ect for CIS countries
could indicate some reluctance of French rms to locate in countries where the environmental regulation is too
lenient.
When we apply the above methodology to other country groups, we nd that for CEECs and OECD countries
the marginal interaction e¤ect, although predominantly positive, is not signicant, which means that the impact
11Comparing estimation coe¢ cients, not marginal e¤ects, of Tables 2 and 3. The estimation coe¢ cients from Table 3 are
available upon request.
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of environmental regulation for these country groups is the same as for the base country group in models (6)
and (9) respectively, i.e., signicantly negative.
The most obvious pollution haven e¤ect appears for emerging countries. Thus, as we can observe in Figures
3 and 4, the interaction e¤ect is negative for all observations related to emerging countries, and signicant for
most of them.
- Figure 3 here -
- Figure 4 here -
We can thus say that the negative e¤ect of environmental regulation is the strongest for emerging countries,
compared to the base country group.
6 Conclusion
In this study we have tested the pollution haven hypothesis through an analysis of the impact of environmen-
tal regulation on French manufacturing rmslocation choice. Using rm-level data concerning French rms
locations in the world, we have rst tested this hypothesis for a pooled sample, and then tested it making a
distinction between four country groups: transition CEECs, transition countries of CIS, emerging countries,
and high-income OECD countries. By applying a geographic economy model, which has the advantage of con-
sidering a complete set of FDI determinants like market potential, production factors and governance quality,
and by developing a complex index encompassing the di¤erent aspects of environmental regulation, we have
succeeded in expressing the stringency of environmental regulation in a satisfying way and in revealing thus the
existence of pollution havens.
Empirical results of the base model show that in presence of heterogeneous countries, French manufacturing
industries locate in countries with more lenient regulations, thus conrming the essential role played by envi-
ronmental regulation in determining rmslocation. Moreover, this e¤ect is reinforced for the most polluting
rms.
In order to test the robustness of our empirical results and considering only the rms belonging to the most
polluting industries, we identied the country groups that are the most likely to constitute pollution havens.
Estimations including interaction terms between environmental regulation and country groups validated the
pollution haven hypothesis for CEECs, emerging and OECD countries included in our sample. On the contrary,
concerning CIS countries, a more stringent regulation seems rather to attract investments. Finally, we show
that the pollution hypothesis holds the strongest for emerging economies.
As for the policy implications, we conclude that the approval or rejection of the pollution haven hypothe-
sis is not su¢ cient to respond to fears related to the impact on rm location of heterogeneous environmental
regulations between economies. Indeed, although our study has validated the pollution haven hypothesis for
a pooled sample of countries, it highlights that too large a gap in the stringency of environmental regulation
between countries deters foreign investments from the less regulated ones, usually poorer countries. Conse-
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quently, a too lenient environmental policy in the less developed countries could be to the detriment of their
technological modernization that might result from FDI externalities, and thus prevent potential host countries
from improving their environmental quality. Research examining to which extent pollution havens imply a real
threat to the environment, or at the opposite could be benecial to it thanks to technological improvements for
example, would be of a great interest.
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Appendices
A Theory - Deriving the demand function for varieties in a geo-
graphic economy model
Following the general description of the model in section 3, consumers spend a part 0 <  < 1 of their
income E on the purchase of the composite good M . Their preferences in a country j are described by the
following utility function:
Uj = C
1 
Aj C

Mj (A. 1)
where CA is the consumption of the traditional good A and CM is the consumption of the manufacturing
composite good M , for which consumers have CES sub-utility functions. CES preferences are at the heart of
the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). In our case, they are expressed in
terms of a continuum of varieties:
CMj =
 
NX
i
Z
ni
qij (v)
1 1=
dv
! 1
1 1=
(A. 2)
with 0 <  < 1 < ; ni is the mass of varieties produced in a country i, i 2 N ; N - the number of countries in
the world; qij (v) - is the consumption of the v th variety in the country j and  > 1 is the constant elasticity
of substitution. The corresponding indirect utility function can be written as E=PM where the price index PM
in the country j is
PMj  P 1 Aj
 
NX
i
Z
ni
pij (v)
1 
dv
! 
1 
(A. 3)
PA = 1 is the price in the normalized sector A and pij (v) is the consumption price of the v th industrial
variety produced in country i and sent in country j. PM is also called a "perfect" price index since it translates
expenditure, E, into utility.
Under the budget constraint:
Lj =
 
NX
i
Z
ni
qij (v)
1 1=
dv
! 1
1 1=
  
"
NX
i
Z
ni
pij (v) qij (v) dv   Ej
#
(A. 4)
we obtain the following rst order condition of CES sub-utility maximization:
[qij (h)]
 1=
 
NX
i
Z
ni
qij (v)
1 1=
dv
! 1
1 1= 1
= pij (h) (A. 5)
with qij (h) and pij (h) - the consumption and price, respectively, of an alternative/specic variety h, h 2 [1; ni].
Next, we multiply both sides by qij (h), take the integral of varieties and sum across the entire mass of
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varieties produced in all N countries. Using the budget constraint, Ej =
NP
i
R
ni
pij (v) qij (v) dv, we obtain an
expression for the Lagrangian multiplier,  =

NP
i
R
ni
qij (v)
1 1=
dv
 1
1 1=
(Ej)
 1. Isolating qij (h) on the
left-hand side, we have:
[qij (h)]
1=
=
 
NX
i
Z
ni
qij (v)
1 1=
dv
! 1
1 1= 1
[pij (h)]
 1 (A. 6)
Substituting the expression for , we obtain:
[qij (h)]
1=
=
Ej

NP
i
R
ni
qij (v)
1 1=
dv
 1
1 1= 1
pij (h)

NP
i
R
ni
qij (v)
1 1=
dv
 1
1 1=
(A. 7)
Applying some transformations to equation (A. 7), we obtain the direct and inverse demand curves, respec-
tively. These are:
qij (h) =
[pij (h)]
 P
i
R
ni
[pij (v)]
1 
dv
Ej ; pij (h) =
[qij (h)]
 1=P
i
R
ni
[qij (v)]
1 1=
dv
Ej ; (A. 8)
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B Market Potential estimation
Krugmans market potential has the advantage of being deduced strictly from theory:
MPi =
X
j

ijEj
Gj

(B. 1)
where Gj =
P
i
R
ni
[ci (v)  ij ]
1 
dv. Nevertheless, compared to the form proposed by Harris (1954), its calcu-
lation needs estimators for the unknown 'ij and Gj parameters. In this study we apply the same strategy as
Head and Mayer (2004) - we estimate these parameters using information about international trade ows. The
aggregate value of exports of country i towards country j, denoted here by Xij , results by multiplying the mass
of varieties produced in country i and sent to country j by each varietys export price (including trade costs):
Xij =
Z
ni
pij (v) qij (v) dv =
Z
ni
ci(v)
1 ijEj
Gj
dv (B. 2)
All variables are specied in section 3.
By grouping the terms according to the indexes and then transforming them in logarithm, we obtain:
lnXij = ln
Z
ni
ci(v)
1 dv

+ ln (Ej=Gj) + ln'ij (B. 3)
Following Redding and Venables (2004), we estimate the rst two terms by using exporter and importer
xed e¤ects, denoted here EXi and IMj , respectively. The bilateral access to the market ('ij) is considered in
a similar way as in Head and Mayer (2004) to be a function of distance (dij), contiguity (Bij = 1 if countries i
and j share a common border and 0 otherwise), common language ( Lij = 1 if i and j share a language and 0
otherwise) and an error term, ij . The trade equation to be estimated is then:
lnXij = EXi + IMj    ln dij + Bij + Lij + ij (B. 4)
This equation is regressed on the bilateral trade ows of 168 countries over the period 1990-2000 (Feenstras
database on world trade ows, NBER) and 79 countries over the period 2001-2004 (Chelem database). The
variables necessary to the calculation of ij are taken from CEPIIs Distances database.
Using the specications
^
ij = d
 
^

ij exp
^
Bij +
^
Lij

and Ej=Gj = exp (IMj), we calculate the market
potential.
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C List of countries in the sample
Transition countries, CEECs: Bulgaria - Czech Republic - Estonia - Hungary - Latvia - Lithuania - Poland
- Romania - Slovak Republic - Slovenia.
Transition countries, CIS: Azerbaijan - Georgia - Kazakhstan - Uzbekistan - Ukraine - Russia.
Emerging economies: Argentina - Brazil - Chile - China - Colombia - Egypt - India - Indonesia - Iran - Israel
- Malaysia - Mexico - Morocco - Pakistan - Peru - the Philippines - Republic of Korea - Singapore - South Africa
- Thailand - Turkey - Venezuela.
High-income OECD countries: Australia - Austria - Canada - Denmark - Finland - Germany - Greece - Italy
- Ireland - New Zealand - Netherlands - Norway - Portugal - Spain - Sweden - Switzerland - United Kingdom.
D Summary statistics
- Table 4 here -
E Data summary
- Table 5 here -
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ER index MEA ISO 14001 NGO Energy e¢ ciency
Index ER 1.000
MEA 0.534 1.000
ISO 14001 0.496 0.267 1.000
NGO 0.633 0.247 0.456 1.000
Energy e¢ ciency 0.585 0.389 0.092 0.118 1.000
Table 1: Correlation of environmental index components
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Conditional logit
Variables Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnMP 0.566*** 0.516*** 0.437*** 0.494*** 0.479***
(0.049) (0.054) (0.093) (0.11) (0.10)
TFP_growth 1.667** 1.573** 2.330*** 1.999**
(0.67) (0.66) (0.84) (0.80)
lnKLt 1 -0.362*** -0.391*** -0.368*** -0.355*** -0.324***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.091) (0.089) (0.089)
lnERt 1 -1.839*** -1.848*** -1.934*** -1.476*** -1.577***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.33) (0.41) (0.39)
lnCORRUP -1.051*** -1.117*** -0.746* 0.0390 -0.213
(0.25) (0.25) (0.45) (0.48) (0.46)
lnPOLSTAB 0.590** 0.777*** 0.534* 1.142** 0.960**
(0.22) (0.21) (0.29) (0.46) (0.40)
lnREGULQUAL 0.778*** 0.675** 1.418*** 1.054 0.732
(0.29) (0.29) (0.42) (0.74) (0.66)
TrCEEC -0.232* 0.0918 0.186 0.141 0.219
(0.14) (0.18) (0.28) (0.30) (0.30)
TrCIS -0.433** -0.220 -0.230 0.154 0.0162
(0.21) (0.23) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40)
EMERG 0.515*** 0.808*** 0.866*** 1.138*** 1.123***
(0.12) (0.16) (0.27) (0.34) (0.32)
PTA 0.392*** 0.483** 0.702** 0.640**
(0.14) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25)
lnR&D 0.0713** 0.0667**
(0.033) (0.031)
Observations 71097 71097 33065 21500 21486
Pseudo R2 0.0356 0.0365 0.0318 0.0325 0.0339
Bootstrap standard-errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Table 2: Conditional logit estimates for the pooled sample of countries, coe¢ cients
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Logit estimations (adjusted standard-errors for intragroup correlation)
Variables Models
(6) (7) (8) (9)
lnMP 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TFP_growth 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** .024***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
lnKLt 1 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
lnERt 1 -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.020**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
lnER*TrCEEC 0.004
(0.015)
lnER*TrCIS 0.188***
(0.029)
lnER*EMERG -0.017
(0.012)
lnER*OECD -0.011
(0.011)
lnCORRUP -0.011* -0.007 -0.011* -0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
lnPOLSTAB 0.008* 0.012*** 0.007* 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
lnREGULQUAL 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
PTA 0.007** 0.008** 0.007** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Country-group dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38586 38586 38586 38586
Pseudo R2 0.0249 0.03 0.0252 0.0250
Adjusted standard-errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.
Table 3: Interaction terms in logit estimations, marginal e¤ects
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Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max
MP 12.97 13.32 2.12 68.46
TFP_growth -0.094 0.08 -0.84 0.10
KLt 1 33874 37764 1139 204495
ERt 1 54.68 8.90 34.04 84.94
CORRUP 30.95 9.91 17.91 54.20
POLSTAB 3.401 0.88 1.05 4.76
REGULQUAL 4.60 0.85 2.18 6.31
PTA 0.35 0.48 0 1
RD 8.03 60.31 0.08 569.10
Table 4: Descriptive statistics, model (3)
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Caption text for gures
Figure 1: Positive e¤ect for CIS countries.
Figure 2: Signicance of the interaction coe¢ cient, CIS countries.
Figure 3: Negative e¤ect for emerging countries.
Figure 4: Signicance of the interaction coe¢ cient, emerging countries.
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